How cognitive modeling can identify response biases in negotiations

Using Drift Diffusion Modeling for lab and field bargaining to study how responders strategically manipulate their response times

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Collaborators: Ian Krajbich, Wenjia Joyce Zhao

Programming: R, stan

Skills: Bayesian Statistics, Model Comparison, Sequential Sampling Models, Supercomputing Resources

๐Ÿ”ญ About


Many decisions involve a process of comparing and accumulating net evidence in favor of the choice options up to a predetermined boundary, a process which takes time and reflects the strength of the net evidence. The evidence reflects the agentโ€™s evaluation of the choice options โ€“ an agent deciding between an apple ( ๐ŸŽย ) and an orange ( ๐ŸŠย ) must weigh the benefits and costs of the apple against those of the orange.

If these two evaluations are roughly equal ( ๐ŸŽย ~ ๐ŸŠ), the agent will struggle to decide which item to choose ( ๐Ÿขย ). On the other hand, if the agent finds the orange to be much more attractive than the apple ( ๐ŸŠย > ๐ŸŽย or ๐ŸŽย > ๐ŸŠ), then their choice will be quick and predictable ( ๐Ÿ‡ย ). This relation between strength-of-preference and response time (RT) is a basic feature of evidence-accumulation or sequential-sampling models, such as the drift-diffusion model (DDM, Figure 1).

In the bargaining example, the seller must weigh the buyerโ€™s offer against the utility of the car and/or future offers. If the seller rejects ( ๐Ÿ‘Žย ) the buyerโ€™s offer quickly ( ๐Ÿ‡ย ), they signal to the buyer that the offer was far too low; if the seller rejects ( ๐Ÿ‘Žย ) the offer slowly ( ๐Ÿขย ), they signal to the buyer that the offer was competitive.